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The long-standing but subdued territori-al disputes over a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, known 
as Diaoyu in China, Diaoyutai in Taiwan, and 
Senkaku in Japan, reignited in September 2012 
when the Japanese government “nationalized” 
the islands in a purported “purchase” to pre-
empt the controversial purchase proposed by 
the then-governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara. 
While most analysts focus their attention on the 
rising tensions between China and Japan and 
the implications for the United States, Taiwan 
(officially Republic of China, or ROC) is also 
a claimant and somehow managed to make its 
presence known through a delicate legal and 
diplomatic strategy.
The ROC claims that the islands form an in-
herent territory of Taiwan based on the islands’ 
geographical location, geological structure, his-
torical evidence, usage, and international law.1 
However, its position is complicated by the fact 
that the ROC retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was estab-
lished on the mainland the same year and has 
maintained a strict “one China” policy claim-
ing it is the real China and Taiwan is a part of 
China, and by the fact that neither the ROC nor 
the PRC were parties to the 1951 San Francis-
co Peace Treaty. Notwithstanding their fierce 
confrontation with each other, the ROC and the 
PRC have made basically similar claims owing 
to their shared history. Yet Taiwan has chosen 
to make its own claims, rather than siding with 
Beijing, and propose its own diplomatic initia-
tive (to be discussed later) due to the sensitive 
geopolitics involved in these territorial disputes.
According to the ROC version, China dis-
covered the Diaoyutai Islands in 1372 during 
the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and since then, 
the Chinese people have been closely linked to 
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them. The areas surrounding the islands had 
been repeatedly referred to as part of Chinese 
history since 1534. Chinese envoys at the time 
used the islands as a navigation post en route to 
the Ryūkyū Kingdom (now Okinawa)—a trib-
utary state of China’s, and the Ming court, also 
incorporated the islands into its coastal defense 
system against Japanese pirates.2
According to ROC Foreign Minister David 
Lin, “The most authoritative historical records 
supporting the Chinese claim are envoy mission 
records and official Taiwan gazetteers published 
during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).”3 This 
contradicts the Japanese government’s assertion 
that from 1885 on, it repeatedly conducted on-
site surveys that confirmed that the islands were 
uninhabited and there were no signs of control 
by the Qing Empire. However, Taiwanese re-
searcher Han-yi Shaw’s study of “over 40 official 
Meiji period documents unearthed from the 
Japanese National Archives, Diplomatic Records 
Office, and National Institute of Defense Studies 
Library clearly demonstrate that the Meiji gov-
ernment acknowledged Chinese ownership of 
the islands in 1885.”4 Both the Japanese foreign 
minister and the Okinawa governor expressed 
their concerns. However, Japanese assessment 
changed after it won the 1894–1895 Sino-Jap-
anese War. The Meiji government, following a 
cabinet decision on January 14, 1895 during the 
ongoing war, promptly incorporated the islands 
as war booty. The cabinet decision was never 
made public. Lin describes Japan’s claim of sov-
ereignty over the islands as “based on an illegal 
act of secretly annexing the islands as spoils of 
war under the false pretext of seizing terra nulli-
us (“land belonging to no one”).5
In April 1895, Japan and China signed the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, stipulating that China 
cede Japan, Taiwan, and related islands. For the 
next fifty years, Taiwan and the Diaoyutai Is-
lands were under Japanese rule.
When Japan annexed the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands in 1895, it detached them from Taiwan 
and placed them under Okinawa Prefecture and 
later adopted the Japanese name “Senkaku Is-
lands”—first introduced by academic Kuroiwa 
Hisashi in 1900. These moves apparently con-
fused Chinese authorities in the ensuing years.
Toward the end of World War II, the Cairo 
Declaration (1945) stipulated that “all the terri-
tories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescado-
res [Penghu], shall be restored to the Republic of 
China. Japan will also be expelled from all other 
territories which she has taken by violence and 
greed.” The Potsdam Declaration (1945) stated 
that “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall 
be carried out,” and Japan accepted the Potsdam 
Declaration by signing the Instrument of Sur-
render. Additionally, both the 1951 San Francis-
co Peace Treaty and the 1952 ROC-Japan Peace 
Treaty stipulate that “Japan has renounced all 
right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and 
Penghu (the Pescadores).” Taipei further claims 
that the 1952 ROC-Japan Peace Treaty further 
nullified the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. There-
fore, according to ROC Foreign Minister Lin, the 
Diaoyutai Islands, as with Taiwan, should be re-
stored as ROC territory.
However, when Japan returned Taiwan to 
the ROC both sides adopted the 1945 adminis-
trative arrangement of Taiwan, with the Chinese 
unaware that the uninhabited Senkaku Islands 
were, in fact, the former Diaoyu Islands. Han-
yi Shaw opines this explains the belated protest 
from Taipei and Beijing over US administra-
tion of the islands after the war. He points out 
that “per post-WWII arrangements, Japan was 
required to surrender territories obtained from 
aggression and revert them to their pre-1895 sta-
tus.” Since the Qing period (1644–1911) records 
substantiate Chinese ownership of the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands before 1895, Diaoyu Islands 
should be reverted to China.6
Taipei further explains that it did not press 
its territorial claim until the 1970s because “from 
1945 to 1971, the Diaoyutai Islands were under 
the administration of the US, not Japan.”7 The 
turn of events during the Cold War—Japan’s and 
Taiwan’s alliances with the US and the PRC’s 
opposition to the US—probably also impact-
ed Taiwan’s calculation. When the US reverted 
the Ryūkyū Islands to Japan in 1972, it also 
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transferred to Japan the administration of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but declared the US 
took no final position on the sovereignty issue 
and transference of the right of administration 
to Japan did not constitute a transfer of under-
lying sovereignty, nor could it affect the claims 
of the disputants. However, according to the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, the Senkakus would 
fall within the scope of Article 5—“territories 
under the administration of Japan.” To help deter 
the use of force, various US officials, including 
President Obama, in April 2014 affirmed the in-
clusion of the Senkakus in the US-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty.
Due to its diplomatic isolation, the ROC’s 
voice is often ignored, even though it is a claim-
ant state in both the East and South China Seas. 
However, Taipei was able to score some gains by 
using what professor and China specialist Den-
nis Hickey calls a “two-pronged strategy.” On the 
“soft” side, President Ma Ying-jeou in August 
2012 proposed an East China Sea Peace Initia-
tive (ECSPI) calling on all parties to (1) restrain 
from taking any antagonistic actions, (2) shelve 
controversies and not abandon dialogue, (3) 
observe international law and resolve disputes 
through peaceful means, (4) seek consensus on 
a code of conduct in the East China Sea, and 
(5) establish a mechanism for cooperation on 
exploring and developing resources in the East 
China Sea. “Implementation guidelines” soon 
followed, calling for a two-stage implementa-
tion: (1) peaceful dialogue and mutually recipro-
cal negotiation and (2) sharing resources and co-
operative development. In response to the PRC’s 
unilateral establishment in November 2013 of an 
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the 
East China Sea that covers the disputed Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands, Ma in February 2014 issued a 
statement on East China Sea Airspace Security 
that extends the basic principles of the ECSPI. 
The peace proposal is consistent with US broad 
policy in the region and has begun to win some 
support. Former Deputy Secretary of State Ran-
dy Shriver calls the ECSPI “the only proposal on 
the table” and is worth a look.8
On the “hard” side, soon after Japan’s nation-
alization announcement, Taipei blessed some 
activists seeking to land on those disputed is-
lands and at one point even dispatched its Coast 
Guard ships to shoot water cannons at Japanese 
patrol ships. Taiwan’s assertive behavior caught 
many observers by surprise and raised the spec-
ter of a tacit collaboration between Taiwan and 
China, despite the ROC’s repeated denial.
Perhaps to head off a possible China-Taiwan 
collusion and with US nudging, Japan signed a 
fishery agreement with Taiwan in April 2013— 
the first concession over the island quarrel after 
seventeen futile previous rounds of negotiation. 
Taiwanese boats can now operate freely in a 
7,400-square-kilometer area around these is-
lands.
Buoyed by the alleged concrete success of 
ECSPI, the Ma administration hopes to sign a 
similar fisheries agreements with the Philip-
pines, with which Taiwan also has overlapping 
maritime claims.
It should be pointed out that this essay may 
fairly reflect the views of the KMT ruling party, 
but may not reflect the views of the opposition 
(pro-independence) Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), whose politicians are more likely 
to view the Senkakus as Japanese territories and 
oppose any collaboration with the PRC. In sum-
mary, despite its peculiar diplomatic status, Tai-
wan is a claimant of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
and East China Sea whose viewpoints should 
be taken seriously. Its ECSPI parallels many US 
objectives in the region and can potentially con-
tribute to regional peace by calling all parties to 
shelve disputes, engage in dialogue, observe in-
ternational law, and jointly share the resources. n
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High school and university survey-level instructors with an interest in increasing stu-dent knowledge and critical thinking about Asia-related issues, including the cur-rent China Sea controversies, should look closely at the Asia resources available at 
FPRI, a Philadelphia-based think tank founded in 1955. FPRI Asia offerings include audio 
and video files of FPRI lectures and online articles, as published in Footnotes, an electron-
ic bulletin intended specifically for educators, and E-Notes, its weekly electronic bulletin 
covering topics in the news. FPRI also publishes Orbis, a quarterly journal of world affairs. 
FPRI has also conducted, since 1996, national weekend teacher institutes that have en-
abled high school teachers from 1,000 American schools and forty-six states opportunities 
to interact with nationally known scholars, authors, and other leaders so they might better 
incorporate world affairs content into classrooms. Past Asia-related teacher institutes have 
specifically focused on China, India, the Koreas, and Japan; a number of other institutes on 
topics such as religion, terrorism, and military history have included Asia sessions. 
The FPRI perspective, as FPRI Senior Fellow James Kurth put it, is to study “the realities 
and mentalities of the localities.” In other words, FPRI explores contemporary international 
affairs through the prism of history, geography, and culture.
FPRI fellows, authors, and speakers at institutes for educators encompass an eclectic 
group of scholars, journalists, and foreign policy experts. Just some of a number of EAA 
contributors who are either FPRI fellows or have spoken at FPRI institutes include Shelly 
Rigger, June Teufel Dreyer, Vincent Wei-chang Wang, Victor Mair, Donald Clark, Kongdan 
Oh, Edward Friedman, Richard Davis, and Edward Lincoln. 
Readers looking for excellent resources on the current South and East China Sea contro-
versies can visit the website and listen to internationally acclaimed author and geopolitical 
strategist Robert D. Kaplan’s April 2014 talk on his latest book, Asia’s Cauldron: The South 
China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, or read June Teufel Dreyer’s May 2014 E-Note 
“Trouble in Fishing Waters: ASEAN, China, and the South China Sea.” The latter two se-
lections constitute only a small sample of FPRI resources on issues relating to the topic of 
this symposium. FPRI’s Asia Program is directed by Jacques deLisle, Professor of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute 
(FPRI)
The Asia Program http://www.fpri.org/research/asia 
A nation must think before it acts.
 —FPRi Founder Robert Strausz-Hupe
